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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Thus far there have been two phases in the critical reception of Isaiah 
Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty (Two Concepts).1  The first saw the 
argument for negative liberty as being primarily negative and 
consequentialist in nature.  It was seen as a negative, in that much of the 
philosophical work in the essay was concerned with pointing out the 
limitations of negative liberty’s positive counterpart.  It was consequentialist, 
in that what was seen to be wanting with positive liberty was not 
inherent to the concept itself, but rather had to do with its potentially 
noxious political implications. 
 
 *  Professor, Département de philosophie, Université de Montréal.  This paper 
was presented at the Law Faculty of the University of Ottawa; at the Conference on 
Isaiah Berlin, Value Pluralism, and the Law at the University of San Diego School of 
Law; and as a plenary address to the annual conference of the Graduate Student Association 
of Concordia University’s Philosophy Department.  I wish to thank audiences at all of 
these events for their comments and discussions.  In particular, I wish to thank Charles-
Maxime Panaccio and Adam Kolber for their extensive written comments. 
 1. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 
(1969). 
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Read in this manner, the argument contained in the essay has not aged 
particularly well.  The Cold War context that inspired this line of 
argument and interpretation is now part of history, and so this reading of 
the text risks relegating it to merely antiquarian interest, alongside such 
other Cold War texts as Karl Popper’s The Open Society and Its 
Enemies2 and J.L. Talmon’s The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy.3 
A second period of philosophical reception of the text dug 
philosophically deeper.  Concentrating on the final section of the text, 
commentators such as George Crowder pointed out the connection 
between the value pluralism expounded there and the defense of 
negative liberty.  To rehearse the argument in a nutshell, if values are 
irreducibly plural, then human agents navigating through this plurality 
need a measure of negative liberty in order to fashion a life for 
themselves out of the many equally plausible ways that there are of 
combining these values into a flourishing human life.4  Taking his 
bearings from the same value pluralism, John Gray famously saw Berlin 
as laying the foundation for a postliberal politics, one from which Berlin 
himself ultimately shied away.5 
In this essay, I want to suggest a third line of argument that can be 
retrieved from Two Concepts.  It is primarily methodological.  It enjoins 
political theorists to define the extension of normative concepts in a 
manner that makes as perspicuous as possible the various normative 
considerations that are relevant to political decisionmaking.  Although 
related to the pluralist defense of negative freedom briefly alluded to 
above, I will suggest that it is distinct from it, and that it allows us to 
address important but underappreciated lacunae that beset the argument 
from value pluralism, as well as the argument according to which 
negative liberty is on consequentialist grounds to be preferred to positive 
liberty. 
I will proceed as follows.  I will first lay out the argument as I believe 
that it can be extracted from Two Concepts and from Berlin’s work more 
broadly.  I will then provide three independent arguments that I believe 
can be mounted in favour of the principle of methodological parsimony 
that I will be ascribing to Berlin.  In a third part, I will distinguish the 
 
 2. KARL R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (5th ed. rev. 1966). 
 3. J.L. TALMON, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIAN DEMOCRACY (1960).  For a recent 
reading of Two Concepts of Liberty along these lines, see James Tully, Two Concepts of 
Liberty in Context (Oct. 18, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the Isaiah 
Berlin’s “Two Concepts of Liberty” 50 Years Later Conference held at the University of 
British Columbia, Vancouver). 
 4. See, e.g., GEORGE CROWDER, ISAIAH BERLIN: LIBERTY AND PLURALISM (2004).  
See also Daniel Weinstock, The Graying of Berlin, 11 CRITICAL REV. 481, 487–89 
(1997). 
 5. JOHN GRAY, ISAIAH BERLIN 145–46 (1996). 
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argument from methodological parsimony from the argument from 
pluralism.  I will show that the former argument provides better grounds 
than does the latter for negative rather than positive liberty.  I will also 
show that it provides a needed complement to the consequentialist 
argument against positive liberty that, as I suggested, corresponds with 
the first period of critical reception.  Throughout, I will show that the 
principle of methodological pluralism provides a needed corrective to 
contemporary theories of freedom situated within the negative liberty 
family that do not satisfy the criterion of parsimony advocated by Berlin 
in Two Concepts. 
II.  BERLIN’S ARGUMENT FOR METHODOLOGICAL PARSIMONY:                 
A RECONSTRUCTION 
Let me begin by quoting from a very well-known early section of Two 
Concepts: 
Everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or 
culture, or human happiness or a quiet conscience.  If the liberty of myself or 
my class or nation depends on the misery of a number of other human beings, 
the system which promotes this is unjust and immoral.  But if I curtail or lose 
my freedom, in order to lessen the shame of such inequality, and do not thereby 
materially increase the individual liberty of others, an absolute loss of liberty 
occurs.6 
At first glance, this may seem like merely a statement of the value 
pluralism that Berlin expounds in greater detail in the final section of the 
essay.  There are a variety of values, Berlin is saying, and it is a mistake 
to conflate them, or to suppose that they all somehow hang together in 
one intellectually and morally satisfying whole. 
This is of course partly true, but I want to suggest that something 
slightly different is going on in this passage.  To see this, let me 
distinguish between four different kinds of philosophical theses that are 
relevant to the overall task of devising a philosophically satisfying 
pluralist theory, but that must nonetheless be clearly distinguished. 
First, value pluralism is a metaethical thesis.  It claims that there are a 
variety of ends worthy of human pursuit, and that they cannot be 
expressed according to a unifying single metric.  It is in this manner 
opposed to monism, which is the claim that the plurality of values is only 
 
 6. BERLIN, supra note 1, at 125. 
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apparent.7  It is also opposed to relativism, which is the view that there is 
no rational way to adjudicate among the very many considerations that 
different people and groups take to be values.  As such, value pluralism 
is a cognitivist position, according to which reason can allow us to 
distinguish real and sham values, but that it cannot express all real 
values in terms of one metavalue. 
Second, it is important to see that metaethical pluralism is agnostic on 
questions of ontology.  Some pluralists may believe that values are real, 
that is, independent of human willing and desire.  Some may be 
constructivists.  Constructivists believe that values do not exist independently 
of the operations of the human mind.8 
Third, value pluralism as a metaethical thesis is agnostic as between 
different first-order pluralist theories.  That is, it tells us that there are 
many different values, but it does not tell us what these values are.  
Pluralists may agree on metaethical and even on ontological matters but 
differ completely at the substantive level at which the variety of values 
that there are specified. 
Finally, and relatedly, there are questions of discovery.  How do we go 
about discovering the values that there are?  Many pluralists have 
historically been intuitionists—Sir W. David Ross9—and though intuitionism 
is still philosophically alive—most notably in the writings of Robert 
Audi10—it has been on the defensive especially in light of the criticisms 
leveled against it by John Rawls.11  The problem is that it is not clear 
which alternative method of inquiry pluralists can mobilize other than 
recourse to intuition in order to carry out the important task of 
constructing substantive pluralist theories.  Thus, for example, one 
pluralist theory that has received a great deal of philosophical attention 
in recent years, the capabilities theory associated with the work of 
Amartya Sen and of Martha Nussbaum,12 has been plagued by its 
inability to come up with a philosophically convincing account of the 
kinds capabilities that there are. 
 
 7. A prominent contemporary exponent of a pluralist metaethics is Michael 
Stocker.  See, e.g., MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL AND CONFLICTING VALUES (1990). 
 8. A leading constructivist is John Rawls.  See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, Kantian 
Constructivism in Moral Theory, in COLLECTED PAPERS 303 (Samuel Freeman ed., 
1999). 
 9. E.g., W. DAVID ROSS, FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS (1939). 
 10. E.g., ROBERT AUDI, THE GOOD IN THE RIGHT: A THEORY OF INTUITION AND 
INTRINSIC VALUE (2004). 
 11. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 34–40 (1971). 
 12. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992).  See also MARTHA 
NUSSBAUM, Aristotelian Social Democracy, in LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD 203 (R. Bruce 
Douglass et al. eds., 1990). 
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Where does Berlin stand on these various issues?  Berlin is not a 
systematic philosopher, and Two Concepts does not lay out a fully 
developed ethical theory.  But there are elements of Berlin’s overall 
philosophical strategy that allow us to make some headway. 
First, and most importantly, whatever one thinks of the 
consequentialist argument leveled by Berlin against positive liberty, it 
matters to my purposes that it is a consequentialist, rather than an a 
priori, conceptual argument.  Berlin is not ruling the positive sense of 
freedom out of conceptual court as somehow incoherent or self-
contradictory.  Rather, he is claiming that it lends itself more readily 
than its negative counterpart does to political abuses.  The way in which 
we delineate and rank values must therefore to some degree be sensitive 
to the uses to which such values can be put.  This suggests that for Berlin 
the values that we choose to include in our axiological repertoire, and 
the manner in which we rank them within that repertoire, are a function 
of the consequences to which their use gives rise.  As a pluralist, Berlin 
is committed to cognitivism, lest his position lapse into relativism.  But 
the “instrumentalism” that I have just ascribed to him suggests that he is 
not a realist, as that term is usually employed in philosophical debates.  
That is, he does not believe that the extension of a concept can be 
determined by just looking at the way things are in the area of value or 
by mere linguistic conceptual analysis.  Indeed, his break with Oxford-
style analytic philosophy can be read as having in significant measure to 
do with its inability to correctly grasp the historically embedded 
meaning of ethical and political terms.13 
Berlin believed that not only the understanding, but also the very 
identification of values, depends upon historical context.  Thus, for 
example, he wrote that “‘each political philosophy responds to the needs 
of its own times and is fully intelligible only in terms of all the relevant 
factors of its age, and intelligible to us only to the degree to which . . . 
we have experience in common with previous generations.’”14 
But Berlin’s historicism also has implications to do with what political 
and moral values are for.  Thus, in a letter, he wrote that “‘[p]olitical 
 
 13. For a fascinating study of Berlin’s early philosophical confrontations with 
logical positivists and their impact on his later work in political thought, see Jamie Reed, 
From Logical Positivism to ‘Metaphysical Rationalism’: Isaiah Berlin on the ‘Fallacy of 
Reduction,’ 29 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 109 (2008). 
 14. Joshua L. Cherniss, Introduction to ISAIAH BERLIN, POLITICAL IDEAS IN THE 
ROMANTIC AGE, at xxiv (Henry Hardy ed., 2006). 
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words and notions and acts . . . are not intelligible save in the context of 
the issues that divide the men who use them.’”15  And in the long 
“Introduction”—in fact a response to critics—to Four Essays on Liberty, 
he wrote that “[t]here are many values which men have disputed, and for 
and against which they have fought, that are not mentioned in some 
earlier phase of history, either because they are assumed without 
question, or because men are, whatever the cause, in no condition to 
conceive of them.”16 
These passages suggest that the embeddedness of concepts to 
historical context is akin to the connection of tools to a task.  Concepts 
emerge that allow people to make sense of the problems that they face, 
and that allows them to address the conflicts and debates that emerge 
through the natural evolution of their common lives.  Values in Berlin’s 
view do not emerge unless they are necessitated by some feature of the 
epoch in which people lead their lives, and by debates, disagreements, 
and crises that emerge within those epochs. 
This historical instrumentalism has an implication for the kind of 
cognitivism that best characterizes Berlin’s theory.  Value terms are 
assessed not on the basis of their matching up with some preexisting 
moral reality.  Rather, their assessment depends upon their appropriateness 
to the practical tasks to which they are to be put.  People can be wrong in 
the conceptualizations that they provide of the predicaments in which 
they find themselves, just as a person setting out to do any job can be 
mistaken in the assessment of the best tools with which to do the job in 
question.  In the very important essay entitled Political Ideas in the 
Twentieth Century—included in the same volume as the one in which 
Two Concepts was reprinted, but unjustly overshadowed by its more 
famous companion—Berlin chronicles the philosophical errors that in 
his view have come to dominate the twentieth century.17  Comparing the 
Enlightenment period with the “new outlook” that had become dominant 
in his day, Berlin writes that whereas in the context of the former, “there 
was at least one premis[e] common to all the disputants, namely, the 
belief that the problems were real, that it took men of exceptional 
training and intelligence to formulate them.”18  He also writes that the 
modern world is marked by an irrationalist worldview according to 
which “unconscious and irrational influences outweigh the forces of 
reason,”19 and by what might be termed a postrational view according to 
 
 15. Id. at xxiii. 
 16. BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, supra note 1, at xlii. 
 17. ISAIAH BERLIN, Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century, in FOUR ESSAYS ON 
LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 1. 
 18. Id. at 6–7. 
 19. Id. at 7. 
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which “answers to problems exist not in rational solutions, but in the 
removal of the problems themselves by means other than thought and 
argument.”20 
Thus, for Berlin, political concepts are intelligible relative to context, 
and specifically to the problems and debates that emerge in particular 
contexts.  The problems that societies have to face are real, and the 
conceptual resources used by those who aim to interpret and address 
them can be assessed as better and worse depending on how well they 
allow them to come to grips with the problems in question.  Mistakes 
can be made both by those who—as has in Berlin’s view been the wont 
of twentieth-century political thinkers and actors—presume to solve 
political problems without articulating them as problems amenable to 
rational discussion and resolution and by those who articulate them 
poorly.  Thus Berlin’s view that “exceptional training and intelligence” 
is required to formulate political problems adequately—choosing the 
right terms in which to make sense of problems requires epistemic skills 
that are not in Berlin’s view evenly distributed among people. 
Reverting to the four kinds of positions described above on which 
value pluralists must take a stand, we can see that Berlin is a pluralist, 
and thus a cognitivist, who gives an original answer to the question of 
the kinds of things that value terms are.  Nothing that has been said thus 
far tells us which position Berlin would take on the third and fourth 
questions to do with the identification of the values that there are and the 
methodology that we should employ to discover them. 
My suggestion is that the passage from Two Concepts with which I 
began provides us with a methodological principle that in Berlin’s view 
should guide political thinkers and actors in the delineation of the 
concepts that they employ to formulate political problems.  Call this the 
principle of “methodological parsimony.”  According to this principle, 
descriptions of political problems achieve greater adequacy to the degree 
that they allow us to distinguish all of the normative considerations that 
are at stake in the resolution of these problems.  In other words, we can 
be mistaken in two opposite ways in describing the ethical problems that 
arise in the course of social interaction and of the operation of political 
institutions.  First, we can err on the side of prolixity by cutting normative 
considerations too finely, ending up with “distinctions without differences,” 
to employ a modern phrase.  Or we can define our terms too encompassingly, 
 
 20. Id. 
WEINSTOCK FINAL ARTICLE 12/28/2009  10:50 AM 
 
846 
making it the case that normative considerations that ought to be 
considered separately are bundled together.  Slightly more formally, we 
can define the requirement laid down by the principle of methodological 
parsimony (MP) in the following manner: 
MP: In describing a human situation of choice, all, and only, 
normatively relevant considerations must be identified. 
How does this principle tell in favour of a negative conception of 
liberty?  Imagine that there are two candidate conceptualizations of 
freedom that might be used for the description of the same situation that 
an agent A encounters.  Call them F1 and F2.  Imagine that the two 
following statements describing the situation in question can be 
constructed on the basis of these two conceptualizations: 
1) A is F1. 
2) A is F2 and X and Y. 
If F2, X, and Y succeed in identifying independent normative 
considerations that all illuminate A’s situation, then F2 is a better 
conceptualization of freedom than F1 is.  However, if one of F2, X, and 
Y fails to pick out a consideration of independent moral importance, then 
F1 is a superior conceptualization of freedom than is F2. 
What methodological parsimony tells us is that when determining 
what the extension of a normative concept is to be, we must be 
parsimonious, that is, we must select the extensions that allow us to 
identify as many normative considerations as possible, whilst avoiding 
the identification of irrelevant considerations. 
The suggestion is that negative liberty, defined by Berlin as “the 
degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity,”21 is 
the conception of liberty that best satisfies methodological parsimony.  It 
allows us to focus on the “nuclear, central, minimal meaning which is 
common to all the many senses of this word, and which signifies 
absence of restraint; more specifically, absence of coercion on the part 
of specified or unspecified fellow human beings.”22 
How might one challenge this claim?  Two leading and highly influential 
criticisms can be framed as applying methodological parsimony against 
Berlin himself, specifically by suggesting that mere noninterference, if it 
is not supplemented by other normative considerations, is trivial, and 
 
 21. BERLIN, supra note 1, at 122. 
 22. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Freedom: Romantic and Liberal, in 
POLITICAL IDEAS IN THE ROMANTIC AGE, supra note 14, at 155, 155. 
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thus breaches the requirement that only normatively significant 
considerations be employed in the description of human predicaments.23 
This approach has famously been developed in different ways by 
Charles Taylor24 and more recently by Philip Pettit.25  Taylor complains 
that Berlin’s conception of freedom would have us count Enver Hoxha’s 
Tirana as freer than contemporary London because of the greater number 
of traffic lights in the latter.26  And Pettit has argued that Berlin might 
have us count a slave as free, if it turned out that his master was 
disinclined to impose too many obstacles upon him.27  Taylor, who has 
been followed in this critique by perfectionist liberals such as Joseph 
Raz,28 argues that liberty is of no normative significance if it is not the 
liberty to exercise meaningful options.29  A purely quantitative or “spatial” 
conception of freedom that eschewed normative considerations would in 
his view be deficient as an understanding of freedom, for it would not 
tell us why we care about freedom at all.30  And Pettit has famously 
argued for a conception of freedom as “non-domination,” and has argued 
that a certain resilience must attach to freedom for it to count as 
freedom: it matters not only that I am free, but that I am immune from—
even the unexercised—ability to interfere arbitrarily with my will.31 
An argument like Taylor’s could in Berlin’s defense be defeated by 
questioning its empirical premise: though there may very well be more 
traffic lights in London than there are in Tirana, I imagine that the 
constant threat of violence that is characteristic of a totalitarian state like 
 
 23. One could imagine methodological parsimony being applied to Berlin in the 
opposite way, that is, by suggesting that negative liberty as he construes it is too broad.  
For example, one might claim that the concept of negative liberty is too broad because it 
does not distinguish between human obstacles that result from intentional interference 
and human obstacles that result from accidental interference.  An objection posed in 
these terms would have to show that it is normatively important to distinguish between 
these two kinds of obstacle, that is, that we would decide how to act in different ways 
depending on how we characterized the obstacle. 
 24. CHARLES TAYLOR, What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty, in 2 PHILOSOPHICAL 
PAPERS: PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 211 (1985). 
 25. PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 
(1997). 
 26. TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 217–19. 
 27. PETTIT, supra note 25, at 22–23. 
 28. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986). 
 29. TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 217–19. 
 30. Id. 
 31. PETTIT, supra note 25, at 21–27. 
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Hoxha’s Albania actually produced a not inconsiderable amount of 
unfreedom, negatively construed, numbers of traffic lights notwithstanding.32 
But a deeper response would be to point out that Taylor denies 
something that Berlin affirms, namely, that judgments about the freedom 
of an individual or of a group need not be an all-things-considered-
normative judgment.  That is, even if it turned out to be the case that 
Albanians under Hoxha were subject to fewer human obstacles than 
inhabitants of London, this would not necessarily lead to the conclusion 
that their overall situation was better than that of Londoners.  They were 
poorer, lived in constant fear, were deprived of the kinds of cultural 
opportunities that Londoners take for granted, and so on.  To say that 
they were freer—operating on the basis of Taylor’s questionable 
empirical assumption—does not in Berlin’s view constitute a final 
judgment about their normative situation.  It merely focuses attention on 
one aspect of that situation, insisting that a perspicuous description of 
their situation not end up lumping separate normative considerations 
together. 
But is the judgment that Albanians are freer even a prima facie 
normative judgment?  Is there anything to be said for liberty in the 
absence of, say, economic opportunity, liberal democratic government, 
cultural institutions, and the like?  To answer these questions, consider 
two distinct situations.  Albania is much as Taylor describes it: backward 
and benighted in all of the ways that Taylor describes, but with a 
population that can go about its daily business without too much 
interference.  Schmalbania is as Albania, but with the difference that its 
population does not have the admittedly impoverished liberty that 
Albanians have.  Most people would, I presume, rather avoid the fate 
both of Albanians and of Schmalbanians, but if forced to choose, would 
probably opt for the fate of the former.  This suggests that bare Berlinian 
liberty does denote a distinctive normative consideration, though 
perhaps a more modest one than many suppose freedom to be, and thus 
suggests that it does not breach the principle of methodological 
parsimony. 
These considerations apply to Pettit’s criticism as well.  As is by now 
well-known, Pettit argues that negative freedom is incompletely defined 
if we omit from it what might be termed robustness conditions.  
According to Pettit, I am unfree not only if someone interferes with me, 
but also if someone has the power to interfere with me, whether he uses 
the power or not.  What is more, I am not unfree when this power is 
employed nonarbitrarily. 
 
 32. For the relationship of fear to freedom, see Robert E. Goodin & Frank Jackson, 
Freedom from Fear, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 249 (2007). 
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I leave aside for present purposes the question of whether or not 
Berlin’s account can capture without modification the kinds of “virtual” 
obstacles to freedom that concern Pettit.  Matthew Kramer has in this 
context argued, in my view convincingly, that it is in fact an obstacle to 
my negative liberty that someone have even the unexercised power to 
interfere with me arbitrarily, as I am likely to tailor my behavior to avoid 
this interference.33  Let us assume that there is a qualitative and not 
merely a quantitative distinction between being subject of interference 
and being subject to the ability to interfere.  Is it not preferable to be able 
to distinguish these distinct normatively relevant facts through two 
distinct concepts?  Do we not lose normative perspicuity by insisting 
that there is one and only one concept in play?  I believe that we do, and 
that we lose the ability to recognize what is intuitively plausible, namely, 
that it is preferable to be at liberty and dominated than it is to be both 
dominated and interfered with.  This recognition does not amount to the 
claim that the former situation is morally attractive, all things 
considered, but merely that it is normatively superior to a situation in 
which one is subject to a master who is also inclined to use his power 
uninhibitedly. 
The gain in normative articulacy that a pared-down, negative 
conception of liberty such as Berlin’s affords us can also be appreciated 
by considering Pettit’s view that nonarbitrary interferences, such as 
democratically decided upon laws, do not detract from one’s freedom at 
all.  Consider two worlds.  In the first world, constraint and coercion 
through law are required in order to achieve a good—say traffic safety—
or distributive equity.  It is, in other words, much like ours.  In the 
second, these goods are delivered without requiring coercion and 
constraint, either because agents have fully internalized the other 
regarding concerns that the law embodies, or implausibly, because they 
have no desires that detract from the achievement of the sought after 
good.  Pettit’s view of freedom gives us no way in which to distinguish 
these two worlds, the one in which the goods require constraint, and the 
other in which they do not.  And yet they are different from a normative 
standpoint.  Surely a world in which the selfsame goods can be delivered 
without any coercion is superior to one in which coercion is an 
 
 33. Matthew H. Kramer, Liberty and Domination, in REPUBLICANISM AND POLITICAL 
THEORY 31 (Cécile Laborde & John Maynor eds., 2008).  Kramer’s views are expounded 
more fully in MATTHEW H. KRAMER, THE QUALITY OF FREEDOM (2003). 
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empirically necessary condition for the realization of these goods.  
Again, it seems to me that the loss in articulacy counts against a more 
encompassing conception of freedom such as Pettit’s. 
Taylor and Pettit succumb to the understandable resistance that we can 
all feel to the idea that a judgment concerning someone’s freedom is not 
an all-things-considered judgment.  But one can both be free and yet 
afflicted by a number of other normatively significant conditions.  
Berlinian methodological parsimony prevents us from succumbing to 
this temptation and thus increases our normative articulacy. 
III.  INDEPENDENT JUSTIFICATIONS FOR METHODOLOGICAL PARSIMONY 
I have thus far claimed that there is an argument to be recovered from 
Berlin’s Two Concepts to the effect that our descriptions of the normative 
predicaments of human agents must be governed by the methodological 
assumption that they face more rather than fewer normative considerations 
in their decisions.  My claim was that methodological parsimony best 
makes sense of the conjunction of Berlin’s particular form of cognitivism, 
his value pluralism, and his eschewal of realist construals of value in 
favour of a kind of historicist instrumentalism. 
I would like in this part to provide independent philosophical warrant 
for this position.  Three claims seem to me to be relevant to making the 
case for it. 
The first claim has already been largely suggested in the foregoing 
part.  Methodological parsimony increases our precision and articulacy in 
describing the situations of practical choice that we confront.  All things 
equal, more precision is better than less, as long as the level of precision 
does not breach the relevancy requirement contained in methodological 
parsimony. 
Second, and relatedly, methodological parsimony leads to a construal 
of our situation with regard to practical judgment that facilitates the 
making of trade-offs and compromises.  Now, Berlin is committed to a 
metaethics that precludes us from reaching for a metric, such as utility, 
to facilitate such trade-offs.  However, methodological parsimony contributes 
to the rational adjudication of conflicts in as much as it allows us to see 
trade-offs as trade-offs.  It may for example be perfectly legitimate to 
limit the ability of citizens to dispose freely of their income for the sake 
of narrowing socioeconomic divides in our society.  But to claim that 
such narrowings do not have costs in terms of liberty, and that they in 
fact enhance our liberty—according to what has seemed to some to be 
the most attractive construal of liberty, which defines freedom as 
conditioned by a certain measure of interpersonal equity—merely 
prevents us from seeing clearly the issues that we must face in modern 
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societies.  In the case of the relationship between the alleviation of 
poverty and the reduction of socioeconomic inequality on one hand, and 
the limitation of freedom on the other, such acts of definitional fiat will 
most likely strike many citizens, whose support for policies of poverty 
reduction will be required for the success of such policies, as 
obfuscation. 
Consider the definition of liberty proposed in a lecture delivered by 
Ronald Dworkin in which he addresses Berlin’s claim that values often 
conflict in political life.  “Your liberty is your freedom to dispose as you 
wish of property or resources that have been awarded to you under a 
reasonably fair system of property and other laws, free from interference 
of others, so long as you violate no one’s rights.”34  Whatever else is 
gained from defining liberty in terms of fairness, it is certainly not our 
ability to see trade-offs clearly.  Indeed, it builds distributional fairness 
into the very definition of freedom, and thus prevents us from construing 
fairness and freedom as distinct normative requirements that must at 
times be balanced off against one another. 
Third, and finally, methodological parsimony raises the justificatory 
bar in a salutary manner before those who would simply replace 
argument for controversial normative claims by definitional fiat.  As we 
have seen, the words liberty and freedom are possessed of considerable 
emotional freight.  Many causes that precision would dictate that we 
describe using terms other than these have in fact been argued for and 
fought for under the banner of freedom.  It is tempting indeed to invest 
one’s favoured cause with the prima facie moral legitimacy and 
emotional pull that freedom affords.  But this does nothing to justify 
one’s position.  And, as we have seen, it leads to needless clouding of 
the terms in which political compromises and trade-offs need to be 
debated. 
Thus, returning to Dworkin’s conceptualization of liberty in the 
passage just quoted, though it may be strategically rational to argue for 
fairness by making it into a dimension of freedom—then again, it might 
not, as people who are antecedently ill-disposed to parting with their 
wages for the sake of equity are not likely to be placated by the 
suggestion that their freedom is thereby being increased—this does 
nothing to increase the independent philosophical warrant of Dworkin’s 
 
 34. Ronald Dworkin, Do Values Conflict? A Hedgehog’s Approach, 43 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 251, 254 (2001). 
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conception of fairness.  I hasten to add that Dworkin has elsewhere 
provided powerful independent philosophical arguments for his 
conception of distributive fairness—a fact that just makes it harder to 
understand why he feels the need to adopt the definitional strategy. 
Berlin’s conception of negative freedom as it is discovered by the 
application of methodological parsimony is a homely and modest 
dimension of human existence.  Much else can be said, and usually 
needs to be said, about human agents whose overall normative 
conditions we want to ascertain, once we have determined whether they 
are free or not.  Those theorists and activists who want to convince us of 
the importance of making some other normative consideration central to 
this evaluation will have to argue for it directly, rather than by trying to 
piggyback onto a normative consideration from which methodological 
parsimony dictates that it be distinguished. 
I have thus far illustrated the moral and pragmatic reasons we might 
have for espousing Berlin’s methodological principles by making sole 
reference to the concept of liberty and to authors that have violated 
Berlin’s methodological strictures with respect to liberty.  But the 
problems that arise for moral and political reasoning when we fail to 
heed these strictures can be felt in other areas of contemporary moral 
and political philosophy.  For example, as I have argued elsewhere, the 
concept of health has in recent years succumbed to analogous 
inflationary pressures as those experienced by the concept of liberty.  
Health has come to encompass all dimensions of human existence 
formerly captured under the concept of well-being, and the social 
determinants, the distribution of which are thought to be relevant to the 
determination of justice in health, have correspondingly grown to 
encompass just about all objects of social policy.  This has led to a loss 
of articulacy analogous to what we currently experience with respect to 
the concept of liberty.35 
There are thus three reasons to adopt Berlin’s principle of 
methodological parsimony.  It increases our level of normative articulacy; it 
facilitates the identification of trade-offs in the absence of a common 
currency with which to adjudicate them when the need for them arises; 
and it prevents the inadvertent or deliberate substitution of moral or 
practical argument on behalf of other normative considerations by 
definitional fiat. 
 
 35. I have explored these issues at greater length in Daniel M. Weinstock, How 
Political Philosophers Should Think of Health, J. MED. & PHIL. (forthcoming 2010). 
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IV.  DISTINGUISHING METHODOLOGICAL PARSIMONY                                 
FROM VALUE PLURALISM 
In this final part, I want to dispel the impression that some readers 
may be left with that I have not in fact revealed an aspect of Berlin’s 
argument in Two Concepts distinct from the argument that I identified 
with the “second phase” in the critical reception of the essay, linking 
Berlin’s value pluralism to his privileging of negative liberty. 
I have already provided one distinction between the two arguments.  
In the hands of many authors who have implicitly or explicitly been 
inspired by the final section of Two Concepts, value pluralism remains a 
purely metaethical thesis, claiming that the moral universe is constituted 
by an irreducible plurality of values.  Methodological parsimony provides 
pluralists with an important ingredient in the method of discovery that 
they need in order to develop a substantive, first-order normative theory.  
The application of the method to the succession of situations that we 
must face as agents and as members of collectivities provides us with a 
revisable—in the light of new experiences and situations—schedule of 
values.  Thus, methodological parsimony answers a question that is 
related to but still distinct from the question to which value pluralism 
provides elements of an answer. 
What is more, if we eschew a realist construal of values, then 
methodological considerations become primary.  They aid us in defining 
the values that are most useful and fecund to us in describing our 
practical predicaments, rather than being answerable to an independent 
axiological reality.  So Berlinian methodological parsimony differs from 
value pluralism at least in as much as it supplements the espousal by 
Berlin of a metaethical theory with a method of discovery, the 
application of which allows us to articulate a first-order theory of value. 
However, the distinct nature of the argument can be appreciated in 
other ways as well.  For example, first-order value pluralisms can fail to 
satisfy methodological parsimony.  That a set of values contains more 
than one value does not in and of itself guarantee that these values will 
not be coarse grained.  For example, a value pluralist who claims that all 
practical decisions can ultimately be reduced to conflicts between liberty 
and equality would, though a pluralist, fall foul of Berlin’s methodological 
strictures.  Methodological parsimony implies the search for a first-order 
value pluralism with the highest possibility of granularity, subject of 
course to the relevancy condition that is an important ingredient of 
methodological parsimony. 
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The distinctive nature of the argument for methodological parsimony 
can also be appreciated by attending to the very different implications 
that it carries, relative to the implications that flow from the mere 
affirmation of value pluralism.  What I want to show is that the argument 
allows us to plug a pair of holes in Berlin’s argument for negative 
liberty, one of them quite well-known, the other underappreciated. 
The negative argument that I identified with the first phase of Two 
Concepts’ philosophical reception claims that positive liberty, construed 
as the rational governance of the will, is prone to giving rise to 
philosophical abuses to a greater degree than negative liberty. 
At first glance, this argument can be seen as wanting in virtue of its 
applying a slippery slope to one conceptualization of liberty and not to 
the other, whereas in fact, as Berlin himself recognizes in the introduction to 
Four Essays on Liberty, “belief in negative freedom is compatible with, 
and (so far as ideas influence conduct) has played its part in, generating 
great and lasting social evils.”36 
Is this concession fatal to this first line of argument?  It need not be.  
Methodological parsimony provides us with a more precise diagnosis of 
what goes wrong in the case of positive liberty than does not go wrong 
in the case of its negative counterpart.  Abuse of positive liberty is due to 
causes internal to it.  It makes the satisfaction of certain rational 
standards a condition for liberty.  The tendency that may in certain sets 
of circumstances cause positive liberty to be embodied in tyrannical 
political forms is given rise to by following the conflation internal to the 
conceptualization, rather than by trying to resist it. 
However, when negative liberty gives rise to the kinds of inequities 
that Berlin alludes to in the passage cited above, it is by doing something 
that methodological parsimony, and the chastened conception of 
negative liberty that flows from it, clearly warns against.  When negative 
liberty is elevated to the status of supreme value, as is the case in 
libertarian theories such as Robert Nozick’s,37 it can lead us to 
undervalue or even to ignore other important values such as solidarity, 
equity, and the like.  But this type of monism is precisely what the 
argument that I have constructed on the basis of the methodology I have 
attributed to Berlin precludes. 
Thus, we are in a position to strengthen the first line of argument to 
have emerged from Two Concepts by clearly distinguishing the slippery 
slopes that confront the two rival conceptions of liberty.  If Berlin is 
right about positive liberty, then the adverse consequences that its 
application can give rise to are, as it were, written into the concept itself.  
 
 36. BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, supra note 1, at xlv. 
 37. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). 
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The slippery slope toward inequality and injustice that the hypostatization 
of negative liberty can give rise to is for its part not necessitated by the 
concept of negative liberty.  Quite to the contrary, the limited extension 
of the concept is in part generated by a more capacious overall theory of 
value, capable of including other values alongside that of negative 
liberty.  Negative liberty makes most sense as an independent normative 
consideration when it is part of a set of values including values other 
than that of liberty.  There is therefore something perverse, from the 
point of view of such a theory, to focus as the libertarian argument does, 
on negative liberty as the exclusive focus of normative attention.  We 
can thus appreciate that Berlin is not simply evincing an ideologically 
motivated preference for negative liberty in placing particular emphasis 
on the slippery slope to which positive liberty can give rise.  An 
emphasis on methodological parsimony can indeed explain both why 
positive liberty is likely to give rise to deleterious political consequences, 
and why negative liberty is less likely to do so. 
The argument from methodological parsimony also allows us to attend 
to a flaw in the argument for negative liberty from value pluralism that 
has been made central in what I have called the second phase in the 
critical reception of Two Concepts.  Let me explain.  Much ink has been 
spilt in trying to determine whether a privileging of liberty is compatible 
with value pluralism.  John Gray and, in some moods, Bill Galston38 
have both argued that a thoroughgoing pluralism does not provide 
liberals with the theoretical purchase they require to give liberty pride of 
place.  A thoroughgoing pluralism would in their view make liberty just 
one value among others.  Any priority that liberals might be inclined to 
ascribe to liberty would in their view constitute a denial of pluralism, 
rather than an implication of it. 
Liberals have been concerned with shoring up the steps in the 
argument linking value pluralism and liberty.39  They have however not 
been sufficiently attentive to the need to construct an argument to 
establish that the conception of liberty that value pluralism underwrites 
is of the negative variety.  And indeed, there are strong prima facie 
 
 38. William A. Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, 105 ETHICS 516 (1995). 
 39. I have, in a Berlinian mood, contributed to this liberal exercise of reconciliation of 
freedom and pluralism in a number of places, including Weinstock, supra note 4, and 
more recently, Daniel M. Weinstock, Value Pluralism, Autonomy, and Toleration, in 
MORAL UNIVERSALISM AND PLURALISM: NOMOS XLIX, at 125 (Henry S. Richardson & 
Melissa S. Williams eds., 2009). 
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grounds to think that the opposite is in fact the case, and that there is an 
affinity between pluralism and positive liberty.  For consider: pluralists 
are at pains to distinguish pluralism from relativism.  Pluralism is a form 
of cognitivism about values, and so it is possible to be wrong about the 
values one proposes to pursue.  If this is the case, negative liberty—the 
ability to pursue whichever value one wants unconstrained—does not 
ensure against the pursuit of sham values.  An argument from value 
pluralism rather than relativism would seem to point toward the need for 
a degree of positive liberty.  Indeed, some degree of rational self-
direction is required in order to ensure that one’s actions will be in 
pursuit of real rather than illusory values.  Thus, it would seem that 
value pluralism does not clearly establish the case for negative liberty as 
against positive liberty.  Liberals have thus far been at pains to show that 
there is a link between pluralism and liberty, but they have paid 
insufficient attention to the question of the kind of liberty that pluralism 
underwrites. 
Methodological parsimony can contribute to establishing the importance 
of negative liberty by showing, first, that positive liberty bundles 
together normative considerations that are for reasons of increased 
articulacy best kept separate.  Rational self-government—the ability to 
scrutinize one’s wants and desires according to some rationally 
defensible theory of the kinds of values that there are—is, to be sure, an 
important normative consideration.  It is better that one subject one’s 
choices to some kind of rational scrutiny rather than acting solely on the 
basis of the relative conative weight of contending desires.  But 
Berlinian methodological parsimony warns against the conflation of 
rational self-government and of freedom.  It is one thing to want to do 
worthwhile things and not to want to do worthless ones.  It is another to 
be able to do what one wants to do.  Ideally, one will want both of these 
conditions to be satisfied: it is a better situation in which I am free to do 
the worthwhile things that I want to do, than one in which I am free but 
not rationally self-governed or one in which I am rationally self-
governed but not free.  The exact balance that should ideally be struck 
between the two normative considerations is a subject of intense debate 
between liberal perfectionists such as Joseph Raz and antiperfectionists 
such as John Rawls.  But it is common ground among all theorists that 
the balance between these two normative considerations needs to be a 
balance, in other words, that pluralism is best seen as grounding an 
argument for the unimpeded freedom to choose among worthwhile 
alternatives, rather than for the elimination of the individual’s margin of 
personal discretion.  In other words, the premise of value pluralism 
grounds an argument according to which some degree of negative liberty 
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is a nonnegotiable dimension of any normatively acceptable human set 
of circumstances. 
Thus, methodological pluralism comes to the rescue of the argument 
from pluralism to negative liberty by excluding positive liberty as a 
conception of liberty, and by suggesting that the ideal normative posture 
of agents in the face of pluralism will be one that attempts to establish a 
balance between the two distinct normative considerations that positive 
conceptions of freedom misleadingly lump together. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
I have in this paper attempted to do three things.  First, I have shown 
that the best way to make sense of a number of philosophical 
commitments held by Berlin throughout his writings is to ascribe to him 
not only the affirmation at the metaethical level of value pluralism, but 
also the belief at the methodological level in a principle of 
methodological parsimony.  I have also endeavoured to show that two 
prominent critiques of Berlinian negative liberty can be framed in the 
terms provided by the principle of methodological parsimony, but that 
Berlin’s construal of liberty possesses the resources to withstand the 
challenge. 
Second, I have shown that there are independent philosophical 
arguments for the principle of methodological parsimony.  It increases 
our level of philosophical articulacy, thereby putting us in a strong 
position from which to engage in the politics of trade-off and 
compromise that is a central part of democratic decisionmaking in the 
context of value pluralism.  It also forces theorists and politicians to 
argue for their preferred positions directly, rather than smuggling them 
in as components of normative considerations, such as freedom or 
health, possessed of considerable motivational efficacy. 
Finally, I have suggested that the principle of methodological 
parsimony allows us to plug holes that have plagued both the first and 
second periods in the critical reception of Two Concepts. 
This essay leaves many questions unanswered.  Crucially, it defers for 
another occasion the question of how to assess and compare schedules of 
values that methodological parsimony does not allow us to distinguish.  
Methodological parsimony allows us to say something about the greater 
articulacy afforded to us by sets of values that are more or less 
encompassing.  It tells us nothing about the comparisons of sets of 
values that are simply not comparable in this manner.  The possibility of 
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radically incommensurable ways of dividing up axiological space 
suggests that methodological parsimony is not the only methodological 
principle that will have to be at work in a fully adequate method of 
moral discovery. 
Still, I hope enough has been said in this essay to suggest that it will 
be part of any such adequate methodology, and that Isaiah Berlin can 
fairly be credited with having seen and appreciated its importance. 
 
